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The Interrelationship Between Common Law and
Civil Law*
Guy Canivet"
When we talk about the "interrelationship" between two legal
systems, it is not the similarities or differences in the substantive law
that really count, but mostly the different types of encounters and
exchanges between the legal systems that are created in each legal
culture. A legal culture is a spirit, a mentality, a set of reflexes of the
legal professionals facing a practical problem. As the great jurist of the
19th century Rudolf von Jhering wrote in his book The Spirit of the
Roman Law in the Different Phases of its Development,
While rules reveal themselves from the outset, while
institutions and definitions of law announce themselves in their
implementation, the driving forces of the law are buried at the
deepest level of its intimate essence. They only operate little
by little by infiltrating, it is true, into the whole of the
organism, but they nowhere manifest themselves necessarily in
a manner evident enough to notice them... They are not rules
but qualities, traits of character of legal institutions, general
ideas that are not capable of any implementation by
themselves, but that have exercised a decisive influence on the
formation of practical legal rules.
The two great legal cultures of the world, the common law culture
and the civil law culture, refer to two deep conceptions ofjustice-the
manner of reaching ajust decision. These conceptions can properly be
called "deep" because they are linked to a history, representations,
legal traditions, political philosophy, and a sociology of legal
professions. All these elements form an environment inhabited by
narratives, symbols, and meanings implicitly shared by a community,
a milieu that, even though it is omnipresent in legal practices, is never
expressed as such. Each legal culture is, thus, like an original fold
which is the matrix of the mentalities and professional reflexes of a
country's lawyers.
Now, the process of globalization is so powerful that, by now, all
lawyers have the feeling of living a sort of generalized legal
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acculturation due to the competition legal systems engage in. The
reason is that, whatever their national and identity force, the two
great legal cultures are certainly not monolithic and closed; they
mutually define and influence themselves; they assert themselves in
confrontation and comparison much more than in withdrawal and the
illusory protection of legal "sovereignism." Culture is not an
intangible and frozen dogma, it is not a denial of renewal; it is a
dynamic, interactive, and living reality. Since it is peculiar to a legal
culture to evolve, and to evolve by opening to other legal traditions,
the problem of the receptivity of each legal culture to the others is
inevitably raised.
There are, in my view, two forms of interrelationship between the
two great legal cultures, common law and civil law, that constitute
two corresponding models of legal globalization: convergence and
hybridization. These models influence the solutions each legal
system will give to the same type of problems it has to resolve. They
represent two different sensibilities, two modes of encounter and
exchange between the universe of common law and that of Romanist
law.
I. CONVERGENCE
The process of convergence between two legal systems is
undoubtedly stimulated by the fact that these systems have the same
types of problems to confront everywhere. Law is not an exact
science; it is rather a form of realization of practical reason. Lawyers
are pragmatic people. They are first and foremost interested in
resolving concrete problems by means of the institutional tools they
have at their disposal, or through other means that are capable of
realizing the expected aims. But since globalization puts us
increasingly in a position of grappling with the same types of
practical problems, what would be simpler and more natural than to
give legal responses that look alike? The model of convergence
seems simpler in the eyes of lawyers because it involves only the
institutional level of justice. We have to discover a parallelism of
legal forms that is not interested in knowing if this or that
institutional transplant from the country of origin will be compatible
with the legal culture and the professional customs of the addressee
country.
The principal reason for the existence of the convergence model
is undoubtedly the pressure of facts, the imperative-especially
material-needs of a country's apparatus of justice. This model
gains force as citizens who go to court do not consider themselves
anymore as mere users of a sovereign public service on which they
have no power. The irreversible movement towards an evaluation of
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the quality of justice and the establishment of a culture of
responsiveness in judges show that the former "administered"
citizens (administris) adopt now the posture of true clients of a good
that is scarce and that has a certain cost. Consequently, we are
witnessing at the same time the rising of a consciousness of the
quality-price relationship in the "consumers" of justice and of the
taking into account of financial considerations by the government.
Of course, one of the main forces of common law systems is exactly
the fact that they have integrated very early in their reasoning the
criterion of the efficiency of justice. The good outputs in the
decongestion of the court rolls, the speediness ofjudicial decisions,
and the true respect of legal rules are visible to the naked eye of
Continental lawyers. It is, therefore, logical that the latter will have
the tendency to copy those foreign solutions that have "proved
themselves," as they say. One can summarize all this by saying that
the growing influence of the convergence model currently occurring
is surely due to the empirical force and to the taking into account of
pragmatic and financial considerations by the Continental lawyers.
A good example of this type of influence exercised by the
common law universe on French law comes from criminal law:
specifically, plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is a form of negotiated
justice that has become, by now, one of the main means of exercising
criminal policy in the United States. Its principal justification lies in
considerations of economy of justice. This institution, that permits
the prosecutor to negotiate with the accused a milder penalty if the
accused accepts to plead guilty to the charges, was conceived, and
then institutionalized, in the United States in order to liberate the
most precious resource of justice, meaning the time spent in open
trials. It is progressively extending to countries of Latin legal
tradition. Indeed, the problem of court overload-most importantly
the hearings of immediate appearance in court-has already taken
such an extent in our country that the French Department of Justice
has put all its hopes in a project called "appearance in court on a
previous recognition of guilt" (comparution sur reconnaissance
pr&lable de culpabilite). That procedure, just enacted by the French
Parliament, will apply to any person who admits to having committed
a crime punishable up to 5 years of prison at the most, and will result
in a deal on sentencing that will be approved by the judge, and that
will lead to a sentence of no more than 6 months of imprisonment
without parole.
To what extent does the introduction of plea bargaining in France
comply with the model of convergence between common law and
civil law? The truth is that institution is purely and simply
transplanted into our legal culture only for its virtue of efficiency,
without any effort of adapting its underlying philosophy to our
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cultural background. According to the economic theory of law, plea
bargaining is a win-win contract, a rational allocation of resources
between the parties. Since each criminal trial is uncertain in its
result, the rational accused is induced to avoid a trial where he could
be convicted to a harsher penalty than the one he deserves, and the
prosecutor is induced to avoid a long and costly trial that could result
in too light a sentence or in an acquittal. Thus, the lawyer for the
defense and the prosecutor's office agree, following a more or less
informal procedure sealed by a written agreement approved by a
judge in open court, on a sentence inferior to the maximal penalty
provided for by the law, in exchange for a relinquishment by the
accused of his right to trial and to due process of law.
But the theory does not withstand reality. The prosecutor
disposes of a negotiation power by far superior to that of the accused;
he is capable of imposing to the latter a settlement that looks more
like blackmail by threatening the maximum sentence. We are aware
that, by that system of negotiation of sentencing, many innocent
people have an incentive to declare themselves guilty for crimes they
have not committed, for fear of being even more heavily convicted
if they take the risk of going to trial. Thus, the idea itself of a public
good of justice, that is impartial and respectful of persons'
fundamental rights, is undermined.
The dominant penal philosophy in France is very distrustful of the
economic and utilitarian model of sentencing in the common law. In
our legal culture, individual rights normally are not legal titles that
can be disposed of freely by their holders. The right to a fair trial and
the right of due process are absolute and inalienable; they cannot be
negotiated or traded off, whatever the anticipated benefit for their
holder or for third parties. The criminal trial does not exist in the
interest of the parties; the presumption of innocence and the due
process rights, that form the axis of every criminal trial, are priceless
and cannot be exchanged for a promise of enhanced utility or
collective well-being.
Nevertheless, we must note that, even in our system that once
attributed a great symbolic force to the penalty of imprisonment, the
finiteness of resources has contributed to the fact that henceforth,
more and more judges conceive of their job as managing the flood of
cases rather than rendering justice solemnly. The project of the
French Department of Justice shows clearly that in France, despite
the cultural barriers separating us from the Anglo-Saxon culture,
punishment consisting in the deprivation of liberty is progressively
becoming a risk that other people have to manage rationally, or even
to trade off in optimal conditions. The convergence here is one-way
only. Punishment, a public and solemn form of manifesting social
reprobation, an expression of sovereignty that has accompanied the
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birth of the modem State since the Enlightenment, will thus have lost
much of its symbolic aura in our legal culture.
II. HYBRIDIZATION
If the convergence model is, finally, a pragmatic model that rests
on the similarity of the problems the two great legal systems of the
world have to resolve, the hybridization model is a model taking the
form of a mixture of the structural elements of these systems. In this
case, the differences between the Anglo-American and the
Continental legal cultures are not to be overlooked: the difficulties
the two judicial systems have to confront are different, or even
diametrically opposed. But each system is mutually influenced by
the solutions that seem attractive in the other system. The outcome
is a procedural or substantive hybridization that results in an original
construction mixing elements of both great families of legal systems.
Behind the existence of two legal cultures that assert themselves
from the outset as very different, and that resist, consequently, the
movement of convergence consciously pursued, we can find some
internal evolutions in all democratic countries. These evolutions are
induced by globalization. Justice has become a scarce good because
it is increasingly popular. By democratizing itself, by becoming a
commodity like the others, justice, both in the common law and in the
civil law environment, is being transformed. Even though difficulties
are peculiar to each legal culture, the challenges that face justice
nowadays are universally common: delays and excessive costs,
uncertainty, and lack of transparence and responsiveness to the users.
This is the point of departure of the hybridization process.
Nevertheless, contrary to the convergence process, hybridization is
the sign both of the existence of legal cultures and of their evolution
in parallel. Solutions tend, of course, towards a convergence of legal
systems, but they do not obliterate the cultural specificity of each
system's respective points of departure.
One can see this process at work in the field of civil justice. The
famous 1996 Report by Lord Woolf on the access to civil justice in
England and in Whales will be used as a basis for the argument
concerning civil justice.
It is well known that civil law is a culture of written, and
exhaustively codified law, expressed in general commandments that
do not leave the judge but a narrow margin of interpretation, but that
gives her, on the other hand, in both criminal and civil matters, an
active role in the direction of the trial and the management of
evidence. It is much less known that civil law is a culture of
multiplication of the means of appeal, of safety valves to assure
oneself that justice will indeed be rendered. In the common law,
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justice is rendered by a body of only a few judges-who are, though,
of great quality and acknowledged by legal professionals for their
excellence. It is, therefore, difficult to accede to judgment, but once
that access is granted, everything-or almost everything-is decided
in the first degree of jurisdiction (at the trial level); in fact, it is
difficult to enter into the judicial system, but not to exit from it, given
that the means of appeal are not absolutely necessary. On the other
hand, in France, the big number of judges, their way of nomination,
and their status, make the quality of justice more uncertain. This is
the reason for the need to multiply the means of appeal in order to
make oneself sure of the quality of justice's "final product." One
might as well handle the cases quickly at the trial level, since we
know that the ultimate decision will be taken at the appellate level,
or even at certiorari, which is open to everyone without restriction,
contrary to what is the case in the common law countries.
Consequently, the problem of delays and excessive costs exists
only at the trial level in a country like England (with the abnormal
pretrial swelling of procedural motions and of exchanges of
documents), while it exists at the appellate level in France (with the
proliferation of dilatory or unfounded appeals, of appeals against
restraining orders, etc.). But if the abuses the two systems have to
fight against are the opposite (vertical for the French system,
horizontal for the English system), the solutions devised on the two
sides of the Channel share, in reality, a common objective: that of
excluding from the civil courts the cases that merely encumber the
court rolls in order to free judicial resources for "real" litigation. In
the common law countries, the obstacles to a democratic civil justice,
close to ordinary people, are essentially the excesses of the
adversarial system. That system leaves the management of evidence
and the control over the trial's unwinding soley to the hands of the
parties and their attorneys, who are extremely expensive. As said by
Lord Woolf in his Report, "the argument in favor of a universal
application of the most red-blooded adversarial model is only valid
if the problems of time and cost are put aside. The system now
works sufficiently well for lawyers and judges, but the ordinary
people are kept out of court."
In France, on the contrary, we have a judicial system that is not
overly costly for the parties, but that tends to make judges themselves
oblivious of the trial's "economic reality." The French judicial
system traditionally functions as an administration, and the French
professionals have not yet integrated the fact that the resources of
justice are finite. The famous principle of the gratuity of public
services often goes against the economic rationality of the system.
We are witnessing the fact that the reformers inside common law
systems (such as Lord Woolf) are trying to control the legal
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professionals by breaking their dominion over the functioning of the
judicial system. For that purpose, they propose some measures
broadly inspired at the same time by the Continental legal universe
(measures such as the public logic of administrative control) and by
the liberal culture (measures such as the wide opening and the
transparency of the market for legal services). On the other hand, the
reformers of Continental systems (like the first president Coulon,
author of a report on the desirable reforms in French civil procedure)
try mostly to give the legal professionals a sense of responsibility by
opening them to arguments of a financial order. But the two systems
are heading towards a sort of "mixed economy ofjustice," by the one
borrowing from the other several structural components in order to
combine them into a novel assembling.
The need for an economic, administrative, and procedural
rationalization ofjustice that is expressed in both cases by a need for
simplification, unification, and standardization of the forms of action,
will result in propositions of readjustment and hybridization of the
civil trial. Thus, Lord Woolf makes two very Continental
propositions for the reform of civil justice in his country: firstly, the
active involvement of judges before trial -judges who would thus
lose their immemorial status of neutral and impartial umpires who
never leave their courtroom; and secondly, the establishment of a
beginning of hierarchy between judges of the same degree of
jurisdiction -judges who would thus move away from their superbly
solitary image of "legal heroes." The need for a true policy of civil
justice is so strong in Lord Woolf s Report that he openly praises, at
the end of the Report, the unwavering merits of the codified
Continental law: unity, simplicity, and above all, accessibility of the
law.
On the other bank, the propositions of the Coulon Report tend
also towards a mixed model that borrows several elements from the
common law, notably the immediate execution of the trial court
decisions in order to restrain the recourse to appeal, and the
rehabilitation of the lawyer in civil justice as an instituted check
against the imperium of the judge that must be preserved in order to
promote efficiency in the management of the trial. The appeal to the
legal professionals calling them to assume their responsibilities is
certainly something new in the civil law universe. This sense of
responsibility is required both from judges and from lawyers. We
need to create a sense of responsibility in the former by making them
more responsive to the economic constraints of the trial, whereas the
latter must ameliorate the quality of their briefs and arguments.
In fact, this model of reciprocal influence and of hybridization
does not respond to a need to copy or, on the contrary, to resist the
opposite model, but simply responds to a common need to rationalize
2003]
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justice. The propositions formulated recently by distinguishedjurists
from the two great legal cultures sketch the outlines of a new trial, a
mixed model between common law and civil law. We can hope that
this hybrid that is proposed to us will combine the best elements from
both cultures, in the respect of everyone's cultural identity.
